This article reviews research from the five income-maintenance experiments in Canada and the United States. After sketching the historical and political context of the experiments, we compare their designs and discuss some important analytic difficulties. Our primary focus is the work-incentive issue, both nonstructural estimates of the experimental effects and elasticity estimates of structural labor-supply functions. We provide initial estimates of nonstructural and structural models for the Canadian experiment. We discuss more briefly some non-work-response findings associated with a guaranteed annual income and offer some personal comments on social experimentation and the policy process.
I. Introduction
The United States and Canada are among the most prosperous industrial countries of the world. But both countries also experience significant poverty amid plenty. In both countries, there is mounting concern that cash transfers by government to the needy do little to diminish their numbers, nor do they lessen their dependence on welfare or encourage their transition to full-time employment. A consensus has emerged that the welfare system in each country is, in its own peculiar way, uncoordinated and inefficient. The past 2 decades were witness to much creative thinking and social experimentation in both countries.
We would like to thank Walter Block for his encouragement and direction in developing this article. We accept responsibility for the interpretation of research findings and any remaining errors. projects breaking with past precedent as well as their spirit in encapsulating an entire generation of thinking about income maintenance possibilities and social reform.
The next section sketches the historical and political context of the origins of the income maintenance experiments in both the United States and Canada. This is followed by a brief outline of the designs of the various experiments, featuring their main similarities and unique aspects and indicating what the experiments hoped to learn respecting the question of work behavior responses. Section IV discusses some selected analytic difficulties associated with the analysis of experimental panel data of the sort produced by the experiments and what problems and benefits were encountered with these unique economic data sets. We then summarize and discuss the work-incentive issue, both in terms of nonstructural estimates of the experimental effects and in terms of the wage and income elasticity estimates of structural labor-supply functions. We present some initial estimates of nonstructural and structural models for the Canadian experiment, the details of which are placed in the Appendix to this article. We discuss more briefly some of the non-work-response findings associated with a GAI and offer some personal comments on social experimentation and the policy process in our conclusion.
II. Historical Background to the Experiments1

A. Origins of the American Experiments
President Lyndon Johnson called for a war on poverty in his state of the union address in 1964. In that same year the U.S. Congress established the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) as the vanguard for the antipoverty effort. The programs discussed by the OEO comprised three aspects, namely, public employment strategies, community action programs, and income maintenance. Although the role of income maintenance to combat poverty was readily accepted, a guaranteed income or negative income tax approach to delivering cash transfers proved more controversial.
The negative income tax idea initially met both opposition and neglect. Some, like Alvin Schorr, deputy director of research for OEO, favored an alternative proposal based on children's allowances payable to all families with children regardless of income.2 In contrast, Joseph Kershaw, director of the research office of OEO, stressed the distributional efficacy of incomeconditioned payments and recommended the NIT proposal to Sargent ' This sketch of the GAI experiments is intended for interest and continuity only. It does not pretend to be a complete critical political history of the experiments. Description of the U.S. experiments is taken from Basilevsky and Hum (1984) . The Canadian chronology is adapted from Hum and Simpson (1991) . 2 Canada has had a system of universal family allowances since 1945.
Shriver, director of the OEO. Shriver was won over by the strong advocacy of the research group, and the antipoverty plan that was submitted to the White House in September 1965 contained the NIT as a component. The OEO also forwarded in October 1965 to the Bureau of the Budget a NIT proposal costing $4.7 billion as the centerpiece of its antipoverty plan. The White House, however, was preoccupied with the Vietnam War and the falling popularity of some of the OEO's social programs; it did not take the NIT proposal seriously (Levine 1975) , and the only response from the president was to appoint a commission on income-maintenance programs (Lampman 1974) . Despite the lack of political enthusiasm, the negative income tax idea did not die. Partly because of OEO's unwavering faith and support, and partly because of the continuing war on poverty, the negative income tax was regarded by its proponents as an idea whose time had come. But besides OEO's support, additional factors contributed to the eventual series of negative tax experiments. The OEO continued to single out the NIT for attention as part of its mandate concerning antipoverty strategies. Additionally, the research staff and OEO bureaucrats were very heavily influenced by what Lampman ( 1974) has called the "ascending discipline of the Program Planning Budget System" (PPBS). Prominent within the OEO were key individuals-many recruited from RAND or the Pentagon, new to social welfare, and without sharply defined loyalties to specific agencies or proposals. These individuals accepted the application of evaluation techniques. Accordingly, the goal of eliminating poverty was stated in income-maintenance terms, alternative proposals were arrayed, and costeffectiveness scores were assigned to different schemes on the basis of the "most bang for a billion bucks." Under this exercise the negative income tax received high marks and consequently had the effect of focusing further discussion on particular aspects of the NIT approach, such as the cost sensitivity and work-disincentive effect of guarantee amounts and tax rates. The effect of general cash transfer mechanisms on the work effort of the non-aged, able-bodied individuals therefore emerged as the (now-clarified) prime empirical issue.
Many critics of the negative income tax felt it would cost more than existing welfare programs since its objective is to extend cash payments to the working poor-a group ineligible for most other programs.3 In contrast, the proponents of the NIT saw the major stumbling block as political. The belief, by politicians as well as the general public, that a NIT would promote idleness among the able-bodied poor was strongly held, and no amount of argument "without hard facts" was likely to dispel such beliefs. This then became the dominant issue-pushing all other disagreements concerning the cost of the NIT, the administrative practicality and S268 Hum/Simpson mechanics of the scheme, the lack or otherwise of stigmatizing effects, and other issues into the background.
Viewing the central problem of the NIT in terms of the work disincentive effectively transformed the issue into one for which economists could claim special competence. In the jargon of economics, the NIT was restated as a controversy concerning wage rate (price) and income elasticities pertinent to labor-leisure choice. Economic theory provided a conveniently coherent model, and economists themselves readily demonstrated that existing data sources could not answer the incentives issue with confidence. Indeed, the early research produced wide differences in the estimates of labor-supply response, particularly in wage elasticities for married women (Cain and Watts 1973 ) that have endured.4 However, the necessary information and evidence could be gained with an experiment. The proposition seemed so simple. Why not try it out? Conduct an experiment! Credit for the initial idea goes to Heather Ross, an economics graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who was working with the Council of Economic Advisers during the summer of 1965. Although Ross's specific proposal was not accepted, it received wide circulation within the OEO, according to Levine (1975, p. 17) , and many econometricians strongly endorsed the idea of an experiment (Orcutt and Orcutt 1968) . Proposal for an experiment received strong support from OEO, which initiated serious planning on the design for an experiment in 1966. The final proposals were endorsed by the OEO research staff as well, and Sargent Shriver added his approval in 1967. Shriver was able to counteract political opposition, and by the fall of next year families had been selected for enrollment in a negative income tax experiment, payments were being made, and the first of the large-scale social experiments in North America-the New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experimenthad begun. The undertaking was not called a negative income tax experiment but instead, for political purposes, a "work-incentive experiment, connoting a happy rather than unhappy anticipated outcome. As well, the experiment now emphasized the purely scientific dimensions of the project-as evidenced by the (deliberate) funding of the experiment through the Institute for Research on Poverty in Wisconsin.
The first income-maintenance experiment in the United States was therefore forged out of sharply different motives and interests. Undoubtedly, the antipoverty program was important in setting the climate for political and policy debate. Equally, the cost-effectiveness apparatus of the PPBS and the strong advocacy of OEO's research staff for the NIT were also ingredients. As well, academic econometricians eager to extend social science into the realm of controlled experimentation played an influential 'Reviews of the early, nonexperimental evidence include Keeley (1981) Other income-maintenance experiments in the United States rapidly followed. The OEO awarded a further grant to the Institute for Research on Poverty for a negative tax experiment in rural areas. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) also funded one in Gary, Indiana, and others in Seattle, Washington, and Denver, Colorado. Each of these other experiments had a slightly different focus and often incorporated additional research objectives, but the New Jersey experiment remains distinctive in setting the precedent for the series of carefully controlled, scientific field tests of different benefit formulas on work behavior.
B. Origins of the Canadian Experiment
The discussions concerning the American war on poverty and the various proposals that evolved as part of its antipoverty strategy did not go unnoticed in Canada. The Canada Assistance plan (CAP) came into effect in 1967 and was to be the centerpiece of Canada's antipoverty efforts. The next year, 1971, saw the publication of the Croll Report (Canada 1971) , which recommended that a GAI based on the NIT be implemented on a uniform, national basis and financed and administered by the government of Canada. The Castonguay-Nepveu Report (Quebec 1971 ) also appeared in 1971 and suggested an innovative two-part guaranteed-income program: one plan with a high support level and high tax rate for those unable to work, and a second plan with a lower support level and a lower tax rate for those with a significant attachment to the labor force. However, the impetus for experimentation and reform came from another quarterfederal provincial relations and the Constitution.
In 1971, a federal-provincial conference was held in Victoria in an attempt to rewrite and "patriate" the Canadian Constitution. The provinces and Canada appeared to reach agreement when Quebec declared that it could not support the "Victoria Charter" because, in part, it "failed to provide for a jurisdictional settlement in the field of social policy" and "no patriation of the Constitution would be possible until those concerns were satisfied" (Van Loon 1979). There was much discontent in federal-provincial relations after the Victoria Conference, and this surfaced in 1972 at the Conference of Provincial Welfare Ministers. Federal disappointment over the failure to patriate the Constitution (including an amending formula) was deep. Unlike the American efforts, however, which all eventually released final reports and findings, the Canadian project languished. The project published no official findings concerning the labor market response of participants, and the vast amounts of data collected remain archived. The Mincome experiment died a quiet death in 1979, officially reported as a redirection of experimental objectives. It must be remembered that Mincome's official demise came toward the end of the seventies. The social security review had ended by then; there was no political support in the country for sweeping reforms of the type promised by a guaranteed income. The GAI concept itself had lost its allure.
During the next years the fate of the data set itself appeared uncertain. The manner in which the data were archived (unpublicized location, unknown means of access, etc.) was discouraging for the research community. Only recently has analysis of the Canadian experiment emerged from individual Canadian academics. Not surprisingly, discussion in Canada to this day concerning the effect of a guaranteed income on work behavior still relies heavily on American results.
III. Experimental Design and Expected Behavioral Response
The income-maintenance experiments remain the focus of research on the GAI, particularly concerning such economic issues as work incentives. While these experiments have many common elements, they also have unique features. As a prelude to our discussion of the experimental results in the next section, we review the design of the five income-maintenance experiments and the anticipated labor-supply response.
All of the experiments were designed to estimate the response of families to a permanent GAI program that would provide income maintenance payments, P, based on household income, Y, according to the formula C P=G-tY>O ify<B=-, t where Y = wh + y, and where h is hours worked, w is the hourly wage, and y is other household income.6 The level of support and program response will depend on the assigned guarantee level, G, and the tax (or benefit-reduction) rate, t.7 Thus, to investigate program response, the experiments offered a variety of plans (combinations of G and t) to selected individuals, including a control group that remained on the existing welfare program but was monitored in the same fashion as those receiving GAI payments (the treatment group). In principle, this design offers a simple, direct comparison of the effects of a shift to alternative GAI plans. In particular, the experiments sought to measure the labor-supply response or, most simply, the change in hours worked, h, caused by experimental intervention. A response was expected on the basis of conventional consumer theory, which may be summarized in terms of the static laborsupply model:
Taking the total differential of equation (2) gives labor-supply response in terms of hours worked:
which depends on the change in the wage rate of each household member and the change in unearned income resulting from experimental intervention. This response may be rewritten to decompose the gross, or uncompensated, wage effect into a compensated wage (or substitution) effect and an income effect as follows:
6 Other household income may include other earned income. Following other analyses of the experiments, we have ignored any cross-wage effects in household labor supply.
7For simplicity of exposition we ignore such complexities as the taxation of net worth. That is, we assume that the net worth of the family is zero in this example. As well, the administrative regulations of the payment delivery system differed markedly among experiments, and these details are also ignored here. This model provides a formal technique, adapted from the classical experimental design literature, to allocate sample points, trading off the research benefits (in terms of a reduced variance of estimated response from a specified response function) against substantial transfer dollar costs per family selected to satisfy an overall budget constraint. Given a response function and total budget, the assignment model produces the sample allocation that yields the least prediction error. The sample assignment can then be adjusted for such considerations as anticipated attrition from the experiment and minimum cell size requirements. While indeed optimal in many respects, the assignment model in retrospect poses some problems for the analysis of response, particularly nonrandom assignment, which will be considered below.9 8As Levy (1979) points out, the argument should distinguish those already working from nonworkers, who will have weaker income effects, and new participants in a GAI arising from a higher breakeven income level. Moreover, for social assistance recipients facing tax rates very close to 100%, after-tax wages may rise as a result of a GAI for many program participants and provide a work incentive rather than a disincentive (Hum and Simpson 1991 
S274
Hum/Simpson Table 1 presents many of the crucial design features of the five experiments, from which further similarities and some distinct features can be discerned. Each experiment concentrated on household units with low incomes. The New Jersey, Rural, Seattle-Denver, and Mincome experiments used similar income cutoffs (about 150% of the official poverty line), while the Gary experiment admitted households with incomes up to 240% of the poverty line and beyond. Each experiment included a number of plans, defined in terms of guarantee levels and tax rates, but Seattle-Denver included a declining tax rate, counseling, and training subsidy plans. The Gary experiment included social services counseling and day-care subsidy plans, and Mincome included a saturation site offering one plan to the entire community of Dauphin, Manitoba. The duration of the experiments was 3 years, but Seattle-Denver enrolled some households in 5-and 20-year plans to investigate the effect of experimental duration.
Seattle-Denver was by far the largest experiment with 4,800 participating families, almost as many as the other four experiments combined. It was also the most ambitious in terms of the variety of plans tested.
Moreover, each of the experimental sites provided a look at low-income households in a different setting and a different area of North America: New Jersey concentrated on inner-city households in an older industrial area; the Rural experiment looked at areas of widespread rural poverty (North Carolina) as well as poverty amid rural affluence (Iowa); SeattleDenver looked at one West Coast city with considerable employment instability (Seattle because of its dependence on the aerospace industry) and another with greater employment stability (Denver); Gary examined black ghetto households, and particularly female-headed black households; and Mincome looked at low-income households on the Canadian prairies in both an urban (Winnipeg) and rural (the Dauphin saturation site) setting.10 Each of the experiments has now been examined in isolation, and various research reports have been issued. In all cases, individual researchers were permitted to develop and test their own models, select their own sample subset, choose their measure of response, and interpret their results. Yet the experiments also represent a series of closely related trials with many common design features that can inform us about behavioral response to a guaranteed annual income plan in the North American population. Although each experiment has unique features in terms of site selection, target population, and plan design, the common features can tell us a great deal about various aspects of response, the most important of which remains the topic of work incentives. We now turn to the analysis of labor-supply response in the five experiments. The five experiments were designed to provide reliable and credible analysis of the response to a guaranteed annual income program to inform policy development. In particular, there was considerable controversy over prospective labor-supply response on the basis of nonexperimental evidence and political perception, as discussed in Section II. Data from the experiments were expected to resolve this controversy. In this section, we consider the analysis of labor-supply response in the experiments, the problems encountered, and the results obtained.
A. Analysis of Labor-Supply Response
The experiments provide panel data with substantial variation in certain critical variables (tax rates and guarantee levels) that are particularly useful in measuring labor-supply response. Structural labor-supply models require more careful specification of the structure of labor-supply response and increase the possibility of specification error or misinterpretation of labor-supply response behavior. Analysis of variance models avoid this problem but cannot be easily generalized for social policy analysis when only dummy variables are used to distinguish experimental plans. The estimated response necessarily applies only to the specific experimental programs tested, and its implications for the evaluation of any prospective guaranteed income program with quite different features-such as the universal income security program recently proposed by the Macdonald Commission in Canada (Canada 1985) -are unclear. Only modified ANOVA (or analysis of covariance; ANCOVA) models that include the experimental design parameters (G and t), such as the spline functions estimated for New Jersey, can predict response to such a program. Estimates from structural labor-supply models, however, can be applied to the evaluation of social policy in general as well as the guaranteed annual income concept (Keeley 1981) . Thus, both ANOVA and structural models provide useful information about labor-supply response, and estimates of each type are considered below.
B. Problems in the Analysis of the Experimental Data
Experimental data potentially resolve some very serious problems in the measurement of labor-supply response to a guaranteed annual income plan. Yet several problems remain, the most important of which appear to be nonrandom selection and nonparticipation. We shall briefly outline the nature of these problems for analysis of the experimental data and then discuss the evidence on the impact of these problems on estimated laborsupply response.
The Conlisk-Watts (1969) assignment model used by all five experiments favors inexpensive observations to improve estimation reliability when the experimental budget is constrained. Nonrandom assignment will therefore occur because the cost of a treatment observation depends on household income that, in turn, affects labor supply, as can be seen from equation (2). Thus, families with low preexperimental income are less likely to be allocated to generous plans (low t, high G), but their low income likely means that they also supply little labor prior to the experiment. In this case, the allocation of families to the treatment group is not independent of labor supply and, hence, not independent of the error term in equation (7). This will introduce bias to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (7) whether it be an ANOVA or structural equation. argue that the only way to correct for the bias from nonrandom assignment would be to include all assignment variables as control variables in the estimated model. The resulting estimates of the experimental effect would be unbiased conditional on the particular assignment made. But, since assignment varies according to family size and composition as well as preexperimental income, the number of assignment categories will likely be very large, and this tactic could seriously reduce the reliability of the estimates (Keeley 1981 ).
The decision whether or not to participate in the GAI experiment depends to some extent on the expected financial gains. Families below the break-even level, B, for the assigned plan face an experimentally altered tax-transfer system that corresponds to the textbook-theoretical case of an unanticipated shift in the budget constraint of the household. Problems of nonparticipation arise for treatment-assigned households at or above B for prevailing (preexperimental) labor supply, however, because they are not affected by their assigned plan at the margin. These households may or may not choose to participate, depending on the size of the compensated wage effect and the proximity of their income to B (Ashenfelter 1980 ). The problem may be further complicated by nonrandom assignment because break-even status and labor supply depend on preexperimental income and family size, which also affect assignment.
Many families in both the treatment and control groups left the experiments before their completion. In New Jersey, for example, 374 of 1,357 families enrolled (28%) did not complete the experiment; in Mincome, 427 of 1,187 families (36%) enrolled in Winnipeg failed to complete all surveys. If this attrition were random, then the only concern would be loss of efficiency from declining sample size. However, decisions to leave the experiment likely depend on the financial incentives to stay, which vary with break-even status and the tax rate ( eq. [1] ). Since the assignment of plans depends on preexperimental income and labor supply, the incentives to remain in the experiment will also be related to these variables, introducing another potential source of sample selection bias to the analysis of labor-supply response. In sum, despite the potential and promise of experimental data to answer questions about the likely work response to Guaranteed Annual Income S279 a guaranteed-income program, the experiments are not without their own analytic headaches.
C. The Experimental Evidence for Labor-Supply Response
As discussed in Section IVA, both ANOVA and structural models provide useful information about the labor-supply response to a GAI using the experimental data. The ANOVA model gives a direct answer to the question, "Was there an experimental response (i.e., does labor supply response differ between the treatment and control groups)?" The structural model, in contrast, answers the question, "What was the experimental response in terms of conventional (substitution and income) labor-supply effects?" The models should provide similar answers concerning laborsupply response to a guaranteed-income program, but the results from the structural model may be more useful in other social policy evaluation.
In table 2 we summarize the evidence from a variety of studies on the difference in mean annual hours worked between the treatment and control groups in the five experiments. For the U.S. experiments, the surveys of One area of concern may be the potential bias arising from nonrandom sample allocation and participation in the experiments. Ashenfelter (1980 Ashenfelter ( , 1983 for the Seattle-Denver experiment and Sabourin (1985) for Mincome both find that participation is primarily determined by eligibility (breakeven status) rather than choice (labor-supply response), implying that participation behavior should have little effect on measured labor-supply response in table 2. Hausman and Wise (1979), using a probability model of attrition in conjunction with random effects models of individual response, find no attrition bias for a structural model but some evidence of bias for nonstructural (ANOVA) models in the Gary experiment. Robins and West (1986) combine evidence from the Social Security Administration earnings records and the Seattle-Denver data base to test various hypotheses regarding attrition bias in an ANOVA framework, but they conclude that attrition bias is not likely a serious problem. Ashenfelter and Plant (1990), however, find evidence of systematic attrition from the Seattle-Denver Experiment and conclude that nonparametric estimates of labor-supply response are sensitive to attrition behavior. Hum and Simpson (1991, chap. 7) find that assignment variables (preexperimental income, break-even status, and family size) are insignificant in the ANOVA model once time effects have been considered. While there is no clear evidence that allocation and participation bias are a serious concern in the experiments, further " We do not consider the variation in response by race. For a summary of the U.S. evidence on this issue, see Robins (1985) ; or Burtless (1986) . The Canadian experiment did not stratify observations by race. 12 Hum and Simpson (1991) find significant reductions in mean hours worked for the experimental groups, but these effects disappear when time dummies are included.
S28 1 research is warranted in view of the recent evidence from Ashenfelter and Plant ( 1990) .13
It is difficult to conclude whether the experimental effects in table 2, even the statistically significant ones, are large or not. The answer to that question depends on the generosity of the guaranteed-income plan offered, and the results in table 2 are estimates of the response to specific experimental treatments; that is, the results are some weighted average of all programs tested at each site. The results merely imply that there would be a reduction in work hours if something like the "average plan" were implemented. Moreover, it is very difficult to compare these results with nonexperimental evidence based on structural labor-supply models.
The structural models are ostensibly based on equation (5) Table 3 ) demonstrates, the Tobit estimator they use has not proven reliable in estimating labor-supply elasticities for nonexperimrental data. Hum and Simpson (1991) find that the Keeley model generally produces larger estimated substitution elasticities than a within-groups estimator, a result that agrees with Mroz. Our results from Mincome are presented in table A2 in the Appendix, and the elasticities are calculated in table A3. The initial results indicate negative compensated wage elasticities, contrary to expectations, but they are generally insignificant and should likely be regarded as zero. Since many studies of the other experiments produced perverse, but small and often insignificant, wage and income effects, our results are consistent with results from New Jersey, Gary, and the Rural experiment, if not SeattleDenver. The one consistently important factor in the labor-supply response of married men and women in table A2 is the presence of preschool children in the home. Preschool children significantly increased the labor supply of the husband and reduced the labor supply of the wife by roughly the same amount. Indeed, the preliminary results from Mincome indicate that changes in family composition may have far more impact on labor supply than a guaranteed-income program.'6 Some changes in family structure, such as marital dissolution, may not be independent of changes in the taxtransfer system, however, as we consider in the next section.
V. Responses Other than Labor Supply
The NIT experiments understandably concentrated on the work response to a guaranteed income, not only because of its significance for calculating program costs should a nationwide GAI be implemented as a tactic for combating poverty but also because the fear of wholesale work withdrawal from the able-bodied population was perceived to be the ultimate stumbling block. At the same time, a number of behavioral responses other than labor supply were investigated. The list of topics examined may be loosely classified in terms of (a) consumption pattern studies, in which expenditure by experimental participants on such goods as clothing, housing, consumer durables, food, health care, debt, and asset accumulations are examined; (b) human capital investment studies, in which responses such as child 6 One unresolved question from our results for Mincome is why wives in the experimental group worked fewer hours (table 2) if their substitution and income elasticities are perverse (table 3) . If their substitution elasticity is negative and their income elasticity is positive, then lower after-tax wages and higher virtual income for the experimental group should lead to more hours worked, not fewer. One consideration is that the reported effects in tables 2 and 3 for Mincome are small and statistically insignificant (i.e., really all zero), but the incompatible point estimates must also reflect the inclusion of changes in the number of preschool children in the structural model (table A2) . Thus the possible endogeneity of family structure, including fertility, needs to be examined in future work. care utilization, counseling, school attendance, nutrition, migration, and geographical mobility constitute the focus of interest; and (c) noneconomic, or "sociological" responses, a term we shall use to embrace such wideranging topics as psychological well-being, marital stability, delinquency, political participation, educational aspirations, and family life. Included here might even be such administrative concerns as misreporting behavior, participant comprehension of program rules, and the like. Thus a rough distinction is possible between consumption and human capital studies in terms of "short-run" versus "longer-run" responses.
Clearly, the above list of topics is wide-ranging, and any attempt to provide a rigid classification would appear futile. As well, many of the studies are not corroborated and are exceedingly difficult to assess. Not only are the non-work-response results more complex in terms of an expected behavioral result, they are also necessarily much more diffuse since there is often no common point of departure, theoretical structure, or even well-defined empirical technique. Nonetheless, the above loose classification can serve to highlight a number of concerns from a policy perspective.
The consumption studies are of interest because of the light it might shed on whether GAI recipients alter their expenditure patterns in a "socially acceptable" manner. In reviewing some of the consumption studies from the Rural experiment, Michael (1978) argued that the investigators were not armed with a clear-cut social issue or an urgent programmatic issue, unlike the question of work withdrawal and its impact on program costs. Masters (1978) disagreed, as did Baumol (1974) in an earlier review of the New Jersey results: "Those who fear the worst of a [GAI] may hold the hypothesis that a large part of the payments will be wasted by the recipients-either being spent on drugs, drinks, and gambling or being dissipated in increased leisure time unproductively used" (p. 253). Alternatives to this view would include the possibility that a GAI will not interfere materially with life-styles at all and that non-work-response effects are minimal.
Baumol's quotation is useful in reminding us that much of the passion and controversy surrounding a GAI centers around what society is willing to accept as a socially approved response to unconditional cash payments. In the case of labor markets, this is clearly revealed as a work disincentive issue. In the case of consumption, this appears more subtly as disapproval over the way GAI monies are spent. As Masters (1978, p. 172) engagingly puts it: "The labour supply analysis is relevant for the stereotype of the poor as lazy bums. The expenditure analysis could be relevant for the stereotype of the poor as profligate boozers."
The consumption studies are also of potential policy importance in deciding between delivery of in-kind benefits versus cash transfers, especially in areas such as housing and food and possible child care or education.
However, many have come to the view that, on such matters, research programs other than experimentation would probably provide better estimates of behavioral reactions (Hanushek 1986 ). Canadians and Americans will have different policy preferences on this topic as well.
Rather less was studied in the experiments concerning human capital investment than was accomplished for the consumption studies. This is perhaps understandable given the very short duration of each experiment, which could be expected to be more problematic for human capital investment response than either work effort or consumption of nondurables. Metcalf (1973 Metcalf ( , 1974 has especially emphasized the fact that a limited duration experiment may underestimate long-term income effects and overestimate long-run price effects. In any case, it is fair to conclude that the various consumption and human capital investment studies from the NIT experiments have had little impact on policy. This is because, in general, the studies show that the experiments had little or no discernible impact on consumption and investment decisions, or, where any response was detected, it was either slight, mildly beneficial, or, in the case of housing, it merely altered the timing of already planned purchases (Hanushek 1986 ). Furthermore, the tone of all these studies, taken together, would suggest that the NIT payments were spent in much the same manner as money income received in other ways.
The various sociological responses are also hard to assess, partly because economists often question the reliability of the scale measures usually constructed. As well, it is generally thought that many of the issues examined under the rubric of sociological responses-such as psychological well being and marital interaction-are not well served by the NIT experimental designs and that any information obtained on these topics is simply a welcome bonus. The one exception is the matter of marital instability or family dissolution.
The impact of a GAI on marital disruption and family composition has become a major controversy and probably now tops the agenda of the policy debate concerning a GAI among policymakers and academics alike. The reasons are quite transparent. First, the cost implications strike a familiar chord; families induced to split in order to receive larger benefits will add to overall program costs, the same fear that motivated the concern over work disincentives. Second, a GAI program that actually encourages marriages and families to break up is not acceptable either to policymakers nor the general public. The third factor is the controversial nature of recent research on this subject.
The initial findings from the New Jersey experiment that GAI payments might influence to some degree the breakup or durability of a family was lost amid the rush of findings on work response. However, the startling findings reported by Hannan, Tuma, and Groeneveld (1977 Groeneveld ( , 1978 and Groeneveld, Tuma, and Hannan (1980) that a NIT program dramatically increased marital dissolutions has been recently challenged by Cain (1986) . Reexamining the same evidence, Cain and Wissoker (1990a) find only mild or insignificant effects on marital instability. As Murray (in this issue) notes with obvious reference to the American controversy, "The dust will settle eventually" (p. S233). Meantime, Allen (in this issue) is left to explore the same difficult questions for Canada in less than ideal circumstances, using Canadian census data and concentrating on welfare in general rather than on a GAI program. The Canadian experimental evidence respecting a GAI and marital stability is just emerging, and it is too early to tell how "the snow will pack" eventually. The preliminary results would suggest a moderate response of marital dissolution to NIT payments (Choudhry 1989; Hum and Choudhry 1992, in press ). This debate goes on, even among the principals (Cain and Wissoker 1990b; Hannan and Tuma 1990), and will doubtlessly continue among policymakers for some time, especially as the controversy over work incentives abates. The battleground of the GAI may be expected to shift to the link between welfare structure and family composition, a much more intuitive and accessible affair than technical squabbles over wage and income elasticity estimates.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Canada and the United States have followed similar paths with respect to the guaranteed annual income over the last quarter century. Dissatisfaction with public assistance programs led both countries to consider a guaranteed-income plan. This consideration was serious enough to motivate large-scale social experiments to determine the economic impact of such a program. The analysis of the experiments and the GAI issue is by no means exhausted, but a large volume of research has now accumulated to pinpoint our common progress toward understanding the economic effects of a GAI plan. We have tried, in the limited space available, to present and assess that evidence from American sources and to provide some initial comparable results from the Canadian experiment, paying particular attention to the primary policy and research topic, namely, labor-supply response or work incentives.
If we were asked to summarize "in 25 words or less" what has been learned from the experiments about the economic effects of a GAI plan we would respond: "Few adverse effects have been found to date. Those adverse effects found, such as work response, are smaller than would have been expected without experimentation." Indeed, in the emerging consensus among economists that elasticities of labor-supply response are smaller than previously estimated, particularly for married women, we argue that the experimental evidence has played an important role (Hum and Simpson 1991). That consensus should influence future policy debate over the costs of a GAL, as well as other social policy reform. Burtless (1986), for example, estimates that the cost in terms of earnings reduction from work disincentives of a fairly generous GAI (75% of the poverty line with a tax rate of 50%) would be between 30 and 60 cents for every dollar transferred to the poor, based on the Seattle-Denver results. Since the other experiments find smaller labor-supply response, this likely provides a high estimate of the cost of a prospective GAI program, but an estimate that is much smaller, and much more precise, than nonexperimental evidence would provide. Whether such costs are "high," and whether such costs are "worth it," depends on the assessor and, ultimately, on political assessment of public support for a GAI. But that assessment will be better informed now that the experiments have reported, if (when?) welfare reform and the GAI return to the policy limelight.
Another question that might be asked is whether the GAI experience contains lessons for the evaluation of social policy. We would argue that valuable lessons have been learned on a variety of issues from experimental design to analytic methods. Lessons continue to be learned from reassessment of the experiments and applied to other, more modest, evaluations of social policy such as employment and training policy in the United States. To those who argue that the GAI debate and income maintenance experimentation was not worth the money, we would simply observe that the money involved was small in relation to annual expenditures on social programs in Canada and the United States. If the GAI experience can sharpen policy debate and help us to avoid ill-advised social policy decisions in the future, then it was likely a solid investment.
(ii) structural models, based on equation ( The results, which are summarized in table 2 in the main text, indicate fairly weak response to the experimental treatment. In fact, although the results indicate modest reductions in hours worked for all groups as predicted, the experimental effects are uniformly insignificant at the 5% level."8 The fixed time effects are quite large, negative and significant for men, indicating that omission of these variables would lead to an overestimate of the experimental effect by confounding it with a general decline in hours worked unrelated to the experimental treatment. Finally, we also include changes in the number of children in the family as an indicator of changes in family structure, primarily arising from births. An additional child significantly increases the labor supply of the husband and significantly reduces the labor supply of the wife by roughly the same amount. Clearly, additional children alter the allocation of time within the household and should not be ignored in assessing labor-supply response.
Our structural labor-supply results are consistent with recent findings of weak labor-supply response to tax-transfer changes, although much more remains to be done. In particular, the entire issue of family structure and labor supply would seem to be a fertile area for further investigation of labor-supply behavior using experimental data. These preliminary results are intended to be comparable to earlier studies, ignoring such important features of household labor supply behavior as cross-wage effects and marital stability. In subsequent work, we intend to extend our analysis to investigate these issues.
